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CLASS ACTIONS
If the learned professions are to enjoy immunity from liability
when engaging in anticompetitive activities that would otherwise vio-
late the federal antitrust laws, that immunity must be found in the
Parker "state action" doctrine. Parker, however, requires much more
than a stipulation that the legislature granted a state regulatory agency
power to sanction generally price-fixing arrangements and an inference
that failure to act amounts to "active supervision." If allowed to
stand, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Goldfarb will mark a signifi-
cant erosion of the scope of the Sherman Act.70
GEoRGF T. RoGISTER, JR.
Civil Procedure-Class Actions-Amending Rule 23 in Response
to Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin
The federal class action1 has been praised as a device that pro-
vides for the small claimant a means of obtaining redress for injuries
to his legally protected rights.' Without this device many wrongs that
are too small in relation to the cost of obtaining relief would go un-
remedied.3 Recently, in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin4 the United
70. The North Carolina State Bar and the North Carolina Bar Association have
acted to foreclose antitrust suits similar to those in the instant case. In 1972, prior to
the district court decision in Goldfarb, the State Bar repealed paragraph three of the
Canon of Ethics Number 12 relating to the use by attorneys of minimum fee schedules.
In addition, the State Bar rescinded all ethics opinions that discussed or related to mini-
mum fee schedules. At the same time, the North Carolina Bar Association eliminated
from its Advisory Handbook on Office Management and Fees the schedule of fees for
specific services. Many local bar associations in North Carolina have followed suit and
have also wisely eliminated minimum fee schedules. Sitton, Professional Liability, 25
BAtR NOTES 84, 96-97 (1974).
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
2. See, e.g., Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 977 (1969); Booth v. General Dynamics Corp., 264 F. Supp. 465 (N.D. Ill. 1967);
Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C. IND. & CoM. L.
Rpm. 501 (1969); Frankel, Amended Rule 23 From a Judge's Point of View, 32 ANi-
TRUST L.J. 295 (1966); Kaplan, Class Action Symposium, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C.
IND. & COM. L. RPv. 497 (1969); Pomerantz, New Developments in Class Actions-
Has Their Death Knell Been Sounded?, 25 Bus. Lkw. 1259 (1970).
3. See, e.g., Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618 (3d Cir.) (Rosenn, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969); Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit,
8 U. Cm. L. REv. 684 (1941).
4. 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974).
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States Supreme Court sharply limited the extent to which the class ac-
tion may be used. The Eisen case was a private antitrust suit initi-
ated in 1966.5 Because his claim was too small to make an individ-
ual suit profitable and because there were many other potential plain-
tiffs,6 Morton Eisen sought to maintain the suit as a class action under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).7 This created consider-
able litigation in the federal district and appellate courts." In 1974
5. Eisen alleged that the defendant brokerage firms had conspired to fix the odd-
lot differential at an excessive level in violation of the Sherman Act. (The odd-lot dif-
ferential is the charge levied on the odd-lot trader in addition to the standard brokerage
commission. An odd-lot trader is one who buys or sells securities in lots of less than
a hundred.) Eisen claimed to represent all odd-lot traders on the New York Stock Ex-
change during a four-year period. The Exchange was also made a defendant. Id. at
2144.,
6. See note 18 infra.
7. Rule 23(b) provides as follows:
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members
of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual mem-
bers of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for
the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members
not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability
to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole;
or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the mem-
bers of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy ...
Eisen also tried to qualify under subdivisions (1) and (2), but the court of appeals held
that they were inapplicable. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 564
(2d Cir. 1968). See also text accompanying notes 21-25 infra.
8. The district court originally denied class action status for three reasons: (1)
The plaintiff could not adequately protect the interests of the class. (2) Common ques-
tions did not predominate over questions of interest to only certain members of the class.
(3) The requirement of individual notice to all known class members could not be ful-
filled. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147, 150-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd, 391
F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968). On remand from the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
however, the district court allowed the suit to proceed as a class action. Despite the
specific notice requirement of subdivision (c) (2) of rule 23, the court proposed a scheme
of notification that fell short of complete individual notice. The elements of the notice
were as follows: (1) individual notice to all member firms of the New York Stock Ex-
change and to commercial banks with large trust departments; (2) individual notice to
identifiable class members with at least ten odd-lot transactions during the period; (3)
individual notice to five thousand additional class members selected at random; and (4)
publication notice in the Wall Street Journal and other newspapers in New York and
California. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 267-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). De-
fendants appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, holding that rule 23 required indi-
vidual notice to all members who could be identified with reasonable effort. Eisen v.
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the controversy reached the Supreme Court.9 The Court held that sub-
division (c)(2)10 of rule 23 requires that individual, mailed notice of
a class action brought pursuant to subdivision (b)(3) of the rule must
be provided to every member of the class who can be identified with
reasonable effort.'1
The Court supported its literal reading of the rule by observing
that the notice requirement for (b)(3) class actions had been added
by the Rules' Advisory Committee in 1966 in order to satisfy what the
Committee perceived as the requirements of due process12 established
in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.'3  The Court, how-
ever, expressed no opinion on whether due process requires individual
notice to all known class members.' 4
In light of the history' 5 and the express language of rule 23,16
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1015 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 94 S. Ct. 2140
(1974). In addition, the court of appeals held that Eisen was required to bear the initial
cost of such notice as part of the usual burden of financing his own suit. Id.
9. In challenging the notice requirement, Eisen contended that the cost of indi-
vidual notice was so prohibitive that it would preclude him from proceeding with the
class action. 94 S. Ct. at 2151. In addition, he argued that individual notice was unnec-
essary because no class member would desire to proceed individually and because, in any
event, he would adequately represent their interests. Id.
10. Subdivision (c) (2) provides as follows:
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the court
shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the
court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B)
the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not
request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may,
if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
The mandatory notice requirement does not apply to subdivisions (b) (1) and
(b) (2).
11. 94 S. Ct. at 2152. The Court also agreed with the court of appeals that the
representative was required to pay for the notice. It distinguished lower court cases
holding otherwise on the ground that they presented situations in which the defendant
owed a fiduciary duty to the class members. Id. at 2153. A case discussing exceptional
circumstances under which the defendant may be required to pay some or all of the cost
of notice is Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 498-500 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd, 438
F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1971).
12. 94 S. Ct. at 2150-51.
13. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). "Where the names and post-office addresses of those
affected by a proceeding are at hand, the reasons disappear for resort to means less
likely than the mails to apprise them of its pendency." Id. at 318; see Schroeder v. City
of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 212-13 (1962). See note 29 infra for the facts of the Mul-
lane case.
14. 94 S. Ct. at 2152. The Court's opinion gives the impression that at this point
it tends toward agreeing with the Committee's analysis of Mullane. See id. at 2150-
52. This analysis, however, is not necessarily correct. See C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS 313 (2d ed. 1970). This Note will attempt to demon-
strate that Mullane does not control.
15. Originally the rule was designed to provide a method for consolidating a large
mimbe of existing or imminent l ?ti ito 9ne action. Beclise the 195$ version Qf
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the Eisen decision as it pertains to the notice requirement is undoubt-
edly correct. Nevertheless, the decision will certainly have a significant
impact upon the use of the federal class action.' 7  Requiring individ-
ual notice to all known class members will dramatically increase the
cost of the procedure,' 8 thus reducing the number of people who can
afford to bring a class action. Because the procedure is most needed
when the expense of litigation is greater than the size of any potential
individual recovery, 19 the effect will be to deny a remedy to small
claimants who cannot afford to sue individually.2 0 Pressure will un-
doubtedly develop to avoid the consequences of the decision.
the rule did not accomplish this objective consistently (primarily because of problems
in determining who was bound by a decision), see Carroll v. American Fed'n of Musi-
cians, 372 F.2d 155, 162 (2d Cir. 1967), vacated, 391 U.S. 99 (1968), the Committee
drafted the present version to give the court power to determine the scope of a judg-
ment. They provided that all members of a class would be included in any judgment,
favorable or unfavorable. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(3). The Committee felt, however,
that in a (b) (3) class action the individual class members' interests in conducting their
own suits were likely to be so great that due process would not allow them to be bound
unless they were first given a chance to exclude themselves from the class or to partici-
pate in the proceeding. Relying on Mullane, the Committee decided that the minimum
acceptable notice to known (b) (3) class members was individual, mailed notice. Pro-
posed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts,
Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 104-05 (1966) [hereinafter referred to as
Committee's Note]. They did not feel, however, that the other categories of the rule
were subject to the same requirement, although it is difficult to find a distinction of any
substance in regard to the rights being affected. It is true that (b) (1) and (b) (2) are
aimed at situations in which the class members' interests are more likely to be inter-
twined. That factor, however, should determine whether the suit is eligible for class ac-
tion treatment, not what form of notice is required once such treatment is found proper.
It is also true that (b) (1) and especially (b) (2) are designed for situations in
which some type of injunctive or declaratory relief is appropriate. See id. at 100. The
right to such relief, however, is just as real as the right to compensatory relief. There
is no reason to require stricter notice as a prerequisite to foreclosing one right than the
other. The rule gives the court discretion to order whatever notice it deems necessary
to protect the (b)(1) and (b)(2) class members. No more is necessary to protect the
(b) (3) class members.
16. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c) (2), quoted in note 10 supra.
17. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1022 (Oakes, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc); Pomerantz, supra note 2, at 1263.
18. There were over six million members in Eisen, of whom 2,250,000 could be
identified with reasonable effort. 94 S. Ct. at 2147. The cost of providing notice would
have been $315,000. Id. at 2147 n.7. Eisen's individual claim was only seventy dollars.
Id. at 2144.
19. Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977(1969); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd, 438 F.2d 825 (2d
Cir. 1971); Ford, supra note 2, at 501; Frankel, supra note 2, at 295; Kaplan, supra
note 2, at 497; Pomerantz, supra note 2, at 1259.
20. This effect will be greatest in areas of the law where litigation is likely to be
lengthy and complex-for example, in the antitrust and securities areas. Because of the
great amount of federal law in these areas, they are likely candidates for class actions
brought under rule 23.
The fact that attorneys' fees are often allowed in this area may not help the indi-
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One possible course available to future class action plaintiffs21
would be to attempt to qualify their suits under one of the other cate-
gories of rule 23(b),22 for which the rule does not require individual
notice. These categories, however, will not prove helpful in the ma-
jority of cases in which numerous small claimants are seeking com-
pensatory relief. For example, subdivision (b)(1)(A) was designed
to cover the situation in which separate suits might establish incom-
patible standards of conduct for the defendant.23 Similarly, subdivi-
sion (b)(1)(B) was intended to cover situations in which separate ac-
tions would, in effect, either dispose of the interests of class members
not parties to the actions or substantially impair their ability to protect
their own interest.2 4  Neither subdivision will apply in the typical suit
for damages. Furthermore, although it would be possible in many
instances to qualify under subdivision (b)(2), the only remedy avail-
able under that subdivision is injunctive or declaratory relief.2 5
The possibility of qualifying the suit under one of the other categories
of subsection (b), therefore, offers little promise to those who seek an
alternativeito the (b)(3) class action.
In light of the problems presented by this and other possible
alternatives,2 the best way to avoid the consequences of Eisen is to
vidual, because the court will probably not award a very large fee in a case where the
recovery is very small. Note, Managing the Large Class Action: Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 87 HAnv. L. R1v. 426, 436 (1973).
21. Although rule 23 allows a class to be either a plaintiff or a defendant, this
Note is primarily concerned with the former situation, which has generally been more
common.
22. See note 7 supra.
23. See Committee's Note at 100. The defendant usually must owe a duty to the
class members, not merely be guilty of having injured them in the past.
24. An example of such a situation is where defendant is unable to satisfy all of
plaintiffs' claims. See id. at 100-01.
25. Id. at 102. The court of appeals in Eisen suggested that this may be preferable
to suing for damages. 479 F.2d at 1019-20. This view is questionable if the desire is
to use the class action to provide redress for injuries. (The fact that the rule was not
created for such purpose should not prevent it from being used in that manner when
it is the best method.)
26. Another possible course is to petition the court for an order directing the de-
fendant to pay for some or all of the notice. As a result of Eisen, however, this would
require proving the existence of a fiduciary relation between the defendant and the class.
See note 11 supra. Even if the relation can be established, the Supreme Court has not
indicated whether it will allow the cost of notice to be allocated. See 94 S. Ct. at 2153
n.15.
A more interesting alternative was suggested by Justice Douglas in his partial dis-
sent in Eisen. He suggested dividing the class into smaller subclasses pursuant to sub-
divison (c) (4) of rule 23. Although Justice Douglas was optimistic about the possibility
of success with this option, he raised several unanswered questions with regard to its
use. For example, he noted the existence of questions concerning the collateral estoppel
effects of a judgment in the first action on subsequent suits by other class members or
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amend rule 23 to eliminate the mandatory notice requirement for ac-
tions brought under subdivision (b)(3). This alternative is not with-
out problems, however. Many seem to share the Advisory Commit-
tee's apparent belief that the rule's notice requirement is constitution-
ally compelled, agreeing with the Committee's interpretation of Mul-
lane. This interpretation, however, is not necessarily correct for two
reasons. First, the Supreme Court in Hansberry v. Lee 28 recognized
that, if absent class members were adequately represented by the plain-
tiff in a class action, they could be bound by the judgment rendered.
Secondly, the Mullane situation can be distinguished in two critical
respects from the typical class action situation, and, therefore, Mul-
lane may not control the type of notice that rule 23 must require.
The first distinction is that, although Mullane did, in a non-
technical sense, involve a party representing a class, 20 the representa-
tive had no interest in common with the class members. As a result,
there was less assurance that he would adequately represent their in-
terests.30 The philosophy of rule 23, on the other hand, is that the
subclasses. He also pointed out that it is not clear whether an action initiated by a sub-
class will toll the statute of limitations for the entire class. Id. at 2153-57 (Douglas,
J., dissenting in part).
There are also potential problems that Justice Douglas did not mention. For exam-
ple, the only situation mentioned by the Advisory Committee in its comments to subdi-
vision (c) (4) was one in which different segments of the class had divergent interests,
so that both segments could not be adequately represented by the same individual. Al-
though the rule does not expressly limit the use of subclasses to such situations, the dan-
ger exists that the courts may formulate a judicial limitation.
Some additional questions concern whether the representative of the first subclass
could also represent the second after a judgment is reached in the first suit; whether
the recovery from a favorable judgment in the first suit could be used to finance the
required notice to the remaining class members; and whether the defendant, having been
found liable once, could be required to pay for notice to the remaining class members.
None of these questions have been answered. Therefore, this alternative is of question-
able value at this time.
27. See, e.g., Ward & Elliott, The Contents and Mechanics of Rule 23 Notice, 10
B.C. ism. & COM. L. REv. 557, 560 (1969).
28. 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940). Because Mullane can be distinguished from Hans-
berry, the former cannot be said to have overruled the latter. See text accompanying
notes 29-31 infra.
29. In Mullane the trustee of a large trust fund brought an action pursuant to a
New York statute to have the trust accounts covering a prior period approved. The
court appointed a special guardian as directed by the statute to represent the interests
of absent beneficiaries of the fund. The representative contested the action, contending
that the form of publication notice of the proceeding prescribed by the statute did not
comply with the requirements of due process because it was not reasonably calculated
to provide them with actual notice of the proceeding. The Supreme Court held that,
as to known and locatable beneficiaries, individual, mailed notice was required by due
process. 339 U.S. at 318.
30. See Comment, Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23(b)(3)-Th? Notic Rt?"-
quirement, 29 MD. L. RFEv. 139, 145 (1969),
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representative can be counted upon to protect adequately the interests
of the class members because he shares common interests with them.3 1
Secondly, the suit in Mullane was brought by a potential adver-
sary of the class in order to extinguish the class members' rights to sue
him. The class action, however, is brought by a proponent of the
class in order to satisfy the class members' rights to a day in court.
Cases applying Mullane and adhering to a strict notice require-
ment 2 can even more easily be distinguished from the typical class ac-
tion. Like Mullane, they involved adversary situations in which no-
tice was necessary to ensure that the individual's case would be
pressed before the court. 3 Those cases are further distinguishable
from the class action, because there was no one to represent the indi-
vidual not receiving notice in the event that he did not appear himself.
In the class action, however, the individual's case is argued before the
court by the representative of the class. If the representation is in-
adequate to protect the individual's interest, redress can be afforded
collaterally without requiring individual notice in every situation.34
Because Mullane and its line of cases developed the notice re-
quirement without reference to the class action, that requirement
should not be blindly applied to the procedure. Such an application
is inconsistent with -the general flexibility of due process.3 5 Rather, a
due process notice requirement should be formulated that is consist-
ent with the goals of 'the class action and the interests of the parties in-
volved. To do this, the interests of the public, the absent class mem-
31. Committee's Note at 100.
32. See, e.g., Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1972); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67 (1972); Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535
(1971); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp.,
395 U.S. 337 (1969); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S.
545 (1965); Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Lambert v. Califor-
nia, 355 U.S. 225 (1957); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); City
of New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 344 U.S. 293 (1953); Standard Oil Co.
v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951).
33. See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (suspension of uninsured motor-
ist's driver's license); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965) (adoption proceeding
against the interest of the natural father); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112
(1956) (condemnation proceeding); City of New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.,
344 U.S. 293 (1953) (bankruptcy reorganization affecting creditors).
34. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Frankel, Some Preliminary Obser-
vations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 46 (1967); Note, Clas Action Treat-
ment of Securities Fraud Suits Under the Revised Rule 23, 36 GEO. WASh. L. Rlv. 1150,
1166-67 (1968).
35. The Supreme Court itself recognized this flexibility in Mullane by allowing
mailed notice instead of the more expensive personal service. Note, 87 HARV, L, IEv.,
supra note 20, at 438,
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ber, and the defendant should be considered. The public's interest is
to encourage the use of class actions as a procedure through which
the small claimant can obtain redress for his injuries.8  The absent
class member's interests are to sue separately, to participate in the
conduct of the class action, or, if he does neither, to be adequately rep-
resented by those actively involved in the suit. Finally, the interest of
the defendant is to know-at the time the suit begins-the probable
extent of the judgment.3T
In balancing these interests, the rule should provide for the public
interest to the greatest extent possible without sacrificing the neces-
sary protection of the individuals involved. The most effective way
in which the rule can further the public interest is to decrease as much
as possible the costs involved in bringing a class action. This can be
done by requiring, in appropriate cases, a less expensive form of no-
tice or even no notice at all.
In considering what notice is necessary to protect the absent class
member's interest in suing separately, the size of his claim and the ex-
pense of litigation are the most important factors. If the expense is
greater than the potential recovery,38 the class member's interest, if he
has one, in suing separately is minimal. Because he cannot expect to
profit by suing individually, the existence of a class action is, in a
sense, a windfall to him. 9 Therefore, his need to participate directly
or to question the adequacy of representation in the class action is
likewise minimal. Under such circumstances, notice, as an absolute
condition to maintenance of the class action, should not be required
for him. In the unlikely event that he does desire to sue separately, it
is more consistent with the balancing concept of due process to allow
him to raise the issue of lack of notice or of inadequate representation
in a later proceeding than to abort the class action because the repre-
36. But see note 52 infra.
37. The defendant also has an interest in not being subjected to frivolous suits by
plaintiffs hoping to force settlements. Cf. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005,
1018-19 (2d Cir. 1973). This consideration, however, does not go to the question of
what notice should be required once the suit is begun. Other safeguards may need to
be developed to protect defendants from this very real danger.
38. This determination could be made at a preliminary hearing. If the court is
unable to satisfy itself that a potential class member has no practical interest in suing
separately, it should proceed as if he did have such interest.
39. It is a windfall to him only in the sense that, as the law is now, without the
class action he cannot effect a net recovery. To the extent that he has a legitimate
claim, the class action merely affords him the opportunity to assert his existing right
to recover. However, given the fact that the class member cannot recover without the
class action, inadequate representation will leave him in no worse position, from a prac-
tical standpoint, than he would have been had the class action never been brought.
416 [Vol. 53
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sentative cannot afford the cost of providing notice. On the other
hand, if the potential recovery exceeds the cost of litigation, the class
member's interest in suing separately, in participating, or in being
adequately represented is substantial. For him some type of notice
should be required. Although publication notice has its shortcomings, 40
the rule should, nevertheless, give the court discretion to decide whether,
in a given situation, such notification satisfies due process. 4' Further-
more, when the class is very large, the need for complete individual
notice may be less significant because of -the greater possibility that
something less will reach people representative of all views within the
class.42 There may also be situations in which the class is so homo-
geneous that a particular form of notice-such as individual notice to
organizations or individuals who can reasonably be expected to com-
municate directly with all or a great majority of the class members-
will be adequate.43
By providing notice to those class members with substantial po-
tential interests in suing separately and by ensuring that the represen-
tative adequately protects their interests, the court will protect the inter-
est of the defendant as well. He will know that those members who
might be expected to sue separately or to object to the representation
have been given an opportunity to do so, and, therefore, are bound by
the judgment unless they excluded themselves from the class. In addi-
tion, he will know that ,the only class members not given individual no-
tice are those who would find it unprofitable to sue individually. Al-
though those class members would not be bound by the judgment,
there is little danger that they would attempt to sue separately after an
40. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 117 (1956); Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950); Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1017 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974).
41. The court is presently given that discretion with respect to class actions
brought under subdivision (b) (1) or (b) (2), so the Advisory Committee has demon-
strated that it does not consider such discretion beyond the province of the court. See
FED. R. Cirv. P. 23 (d).
42. Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARv. L. REv. 356, 396 (1967). There is also
language in the opinion in Mullane that recognizes that less than perfect notice may
be acceptable. See 339 U.S. at 319.
43. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other
grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1971); Comment, 29 MD. L. REv., supra note 30, at
148. This is the theory upon which the district court based its notification scheme in
Eisen. See note 8 supra. The court reasoned that, because all class members had in-
vested in securities, individual notice to brokerage firms and banks with large trust de-
partments, plus publication notice in financial newspapers, would be adequate to notify
those class members with substantial interests in suing separately.
1974] 417
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unfavorable judgment."
The possibility of foreclosing without notice a person's right to
conduct his own suit, however insubstantial this right may be, is,
without doubt, unacceptable to some. The answer to such objections
is that the present rule causes a much greater inequity. It forecloses
the substantial rights of an entire class to protect the relatively insub-
stantial rights of a segment of that class.4" Furthermore, there are
other areas of the law in which individual rights are foreclosed with-
out notice or with less than perfect notice. For example, statutes of
limitations operate without notice to cut off rights of action. Yet
they have been upheld against due process challenges. 40 In addition,
people are charged with knowledge of criminal and civil statutes, al-
though they may have received no actual notice of -their existence.47
Furthermore, the rule of stare decisis affects ,the rights of absent in-
dividuals without notice.4" Also the Uniform Commercial Code al-
lows creditors to repossess goods from the allegedly defaulting buyer-
debtor without notice or a prior hearing. 49 Even in Mullane the possi-
bility of less than one hundred percent individual notice was ac-
cepted by the Supreme Court. Thus, there is adequate precedent
for limiting individual rights without perfect individual notice.
44. There is evidence that a very small percentage of those class members who
have received notice under rule 23 (c) (2) have asked to be excluded from the class. Fur-
thermore, not one of the individuals who requested exclusion brought his own suit. This
is a strong indication that no rights would actually be affected by not providing notice
in limited circumstances. Pomerantz, supra note 2, at 1266; cf. Berland v. Mack, 48
F.R.D. 121, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
45. In fact, under the guise of protecting the members' rights to sue, the rule
takes away from them the only realistic method presently available for recovering
at all. The right to sue individually is worthless if it cannot be afforded. The rule
also "vitiate[s] the class action device in situations where application thereof as a matter
of public policy can be important, such as private antitrust, consumer, and environmental
litigation." Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
46. See, e.g., Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945); Order of
R.R. Telegraphers v. REA, 321 U.S. 342 (1944); Atchafalaya Land Co. v. F.B. Williams
Cypress Co., 258 U.S. 190 (1922); Blinn v. Nelson, 222 U.S. 1 (1911); Hazard, A Gen-
eral Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. C. REv. 241, 288. The class action
shortens the limitation period somewhat, but does not take away the right to recover.
47. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting);
North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276 (1925); Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S.
241 (1907).
48. Frankel, supra note 34, at 46.
49. Umwo omn CoMMmRcAL CODE § 9-503. Recent decisions have put the constitu.
tionality of this provision in doubt. The reason, however, is not the lack of notice so
much as the fact that it allows the debtor to be deprived of property without the benefit
of any representation in a judicial proceeding. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972). The situation in the class action is different. There is a full judicial proceed-
ing, and the members of the class must be adequately represented,
0, .e note 42 supra,
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Although the Supreme Court will have to retreat somewhat from
the absolute wording of Mullane to uphold the constitutionality of a
rule that does not require individual notice in all cases to known per-
sons, rule 23 should, nevertheless, be amended, 51 and the Court
should uphold it.52  Cases such as Eisen, although decided correctly
under the present rule, demonstrate -the need for a device that will help
to create "a system of law that dispenses justice to the lowly as well
as -to those liberally endowed with power and wealth. 15 3
PRCHiARD G. CHANEY
Constitutional Law-Executive Privilege: Tilting the Scales in
Favor of Secrecy
Executive privilege is a concept invoked by members of the
executive branch of the government -to justify withholding evidence and
other communicative materials from the legislative and judicial
branches.' Since 17922 debate surrounding the doctrine has been pre-
51. The amended rule should make no distinction between subdivision (b) (3) and
subdivisions (b) (1) and (b) (2) with regard to the notice requirement. It would still
be appropriate, however, to require the court to find that the class action is the best
available means for handling the controversy. See note 52 infra. The court will also
have discretion under subsection (d) to direct that notice be provided to the class mem-
bers when the court feels it is necessary.
52. Not everyone agrees that the class action is the best method for dealing with
antitrust and securities actions involving a very large number of potential claimants.
See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1019-20 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated,
94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974); Kaplan, supra note 42, at 394; H. FRiENDLY, FEDERAL JURIS-
DicTIoN: A GENERAL Vmw 118-20 (1973). Although arguments against such use of
the class action may have merit, they should not be determinative of the notice required
by due process once the court has determined that no better method exists for handling
the controversy, as it must under subdivision (b) (3). One factor in the determination
may be the possible necessity for future notice to the class members for the purpose of
filing proofs of loss after the defendant is found liable. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jac-
quelin, 391 F.2d 555, 567 (2d Cir. 1968). This possibility alone, however, should not
preclude use of the class action. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722, 726
(1967). In fact, in such a situation it-may be possible to require the defendant to fi-
nance the notice. Comment, 29 MD. L. Rv., supra note 30, at 157.
53. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2157 (1974) (Douglas, I., dis-
senting).
1. Cf. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318 (D.DC.
1966), aff'd per curiam sub nom. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967).
2. In refusing to turn over documents requested by Congress in its inquiry into
a disastrous military expedition against a tribe of Indians, President Washington con-
